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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 68

Accident time: 10:32

Accident Date: 26/04/1996

Where it occurred: Calomanda Village,
Huambo Province

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 30/04/1996

ID original source: IC/JH/NN - internal

Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 21/03/2006

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 3

Map details
Longitude: 15° 43' 42" E

Latitude: 01° 12' 46" S

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate medical provision (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group were running two-man teams and a one-man
drill. In this, the same deminer cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates any finds.
The demining group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would
kneel or squat while excavating.
No report of this accident was found at the Angola MAC. However, an accident report was
prepared by the UN for another accident that occurred on 27th June 1996 and in which this
accident was mentioned. The document stated "about one month ago the same platoon have
had a first accident when a deminer activated a mine with his prodder, without severe
consequences".
The demining group's country manager made an internal "preliminary" report available. The
document was dated 29th April 1996 and the following summarises its content.
The reports started by stating that the accident occurred at 10:02 at an "old military health
post" [the time conflicts with other records]. The investigation began an hour after the
accident. The victim was unable to give full details of his actions at that time. The demining
team had worked at the site for three months and had cleared 2,700m2 and destroyed 405
PPM-2 blast mines. The vegetation in the area was "extremely thick" and three strands of
barbed wire that had been part of the old fence had been cut back to prevent interference with
detectors.
At 10:05 the victim located a PPM-2 at the head of his lane. He called the Team Leader who
marked the mine to be destroyed it at the end of the day. The victim and his partner then
moved to another lane. When they changed roles (resting/demining) just before 10:30, the
victim went back to the lane where he had found the mine. His partner saw that he had taken
off his visor and shouted a warning to him. The victim ignored him and started probing a
metre from the uncovered mine in the belief that a second mine had been laid there (as was
normal for that mined area). He prodded onto a second mine and it detonated. He was blown
back into the safe lane, got up and moved towards his partner. His injuries were all to his
face.
The Supervisor and the medic treated him within one minute of the accident, then took him to
the Brazilian (UN) hospital, arriving there six minutes after the accident. The hospital said the
victim had sustained "minor secondary blast damage to his face and eyes caused by fine
particles of dust". They recommended he be taken to an eye surgeon in Luanda.
Although "all agencies operating aircraft" offered to take the victim by air, the victim was
driven to the Clinica Sagrada Espianca in Luanda, arriving "by" 17:50 and was seen by a
specialist "within" an hour.
The investigators found that the blast crater was 35cm wide and 30cm deep, and a metre
outside the cleared area, following the expected pattern. They found fragments of a PPM-2
[the other mine had been detonated by this time so finding parts may not have been relevant]
and the victim's detector was working normally. His protective apron was undamaged but
splattered with blood. His visor was undamaged. His probe had not been found when the
report was written.

Conclusion
The investigators decided that the deminer acted against the group's SOPs by returning to
prod for the mine. The accident was probably "caused by bad drills…. He may have been
probing at too steep an angle". It was recognised "that the mine may have been laid at an
angle (this had been the case for about 20% of the mines found)" at the site. The
investigators believed that the victim would have been unhurt if he had been wearing his
visor. They said that the Team Leader was not at fault because he was 200m from the
accident site [this appears to contradict his arrival at the accident within a minute] so was
unable to see the deminer without his visor. Deminers had been told to report any
infringements to the Team Leader but the victim's partner did not do this quickly enough. The
investigation concluded that the medical and evacuation procedures went well but noted the
fact that the UN field hospital was incapable of dealing with all types of injury.
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Recommendations
The investigators recommended that deminers should be warned about not using protective
equipment, and given regular retraining on the use of demining tools. Also, they
recommended that a new system for evacuating casualties needing eye surgery be
established.

Victim Report
Victim number: 97

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Long visor

Protection used: Short frontal vest

Short frontal vest
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Eyes
minor Face
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was working improperly (including removing his visor) and his partner lacked the authority to
correct him. The demining NGO involved claimed that all their field staff wore visors and vests
at all times when in a mined area.
The victim is presumed to have been squatting because the demining group approved
squatting to prod and or excavate at the time.
The demining group's failure to accept an offer of air CASEVAC and apparent ignorance of
the facilities available locally raises questions about their competency and appears to a failure
of senior management. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control
inadequacy”.

Related papers
Additional information from an internal demining group document written on 30th April 1996
stated that the victim's injuries had been confirmed as lacerations to both corneas. No other
injuries were sustained. The eye specialist was confident that the victim would not lose his
sight and would be able to return to Huambo on 1st May 1996. Daily washing and dressings
of the eyes could be given by the UN field hospital.
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